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Philadelphia Fed Forecasting Surveys:
Their Value for Research*
BY DEAN CROUSHORE

T

he Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has
conducted both the Survey of Professional
Forecasters and the Livingston Survey for
20 years. Both surveys of private-sector
forecasters provide researchers, central bankers, news
media, and the public with detailed forecasts of major
macroeconomic variables. The surveys have proved
helpful for people who are planning for the future, and
they have also provided useful input into the decisions of
policymakers at the Federal Reserve and elsewhere. In
this article, Dean Croushore provides an overview of the
surveys and discusses the ways in which researchers have
used the surveys.

The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia has conducted both
the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey for 20
years. Both surveys of private-sector
forecasters provide researchers, central
bankers, news media, and the public
with detailed forecasts of major macroeconomic variables. The surveys have
been made available to the public at no
charge, reflecting the public education
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mission of the Federal Reserve. The
surveys have proved helpful for people
who are planning for the future. They
have also provided useful input into
the decisions of policymakers at the
Federal Reserve and elsewhere. This
article will provide an overview of the
surveys and discuss the ways in which
researchers have used the surveys.
The Livingston Survey is the older
of the two Philadelphia Fed surveys.
It started when Joseph Livingston,
a Philadelphia newspaper reporter,
wanted to get a sense of what forecasters thought would happen to the
economy in the next year, and so he
began sending a survey to prominent

*The views expressed here are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.

economists around the country.1 He
continued to publish his survey every
six months, gathering and reporting on
the forecasts and tracking their evolution over time. His survey, which was
the only collection of private-sector
forecasts of macroeconomic variables
in the country at the time, gained a
national following. Economic researchers began using the survey extensively
in the early 1970s to test theories
about people’s expectations. By 1978,
Livingston was having trouble keeping up with all of the requests for the
data and turned the data over to the
Philadelphia Fed’s Research Department, which organized the data in a
computer database and made them
available to researchers on request.
Livingston still ran the survey, but the
Philadelphia Fed compiled the results
and maintained the database. Livingston provided the first report of the
survey’s results in his column in the
Philadelphia Inquirer. When Livingston died in 1989, the Fed took over
the administration of the survey and
carried on Livingston’s legacy. Since
the advent of the Internet, the Fed has
made all of the historical Livingston
data available on its website.2

1

Herb Taylor’s 1992 article describes the survey
and Livingston’s newspaper columns reporting
on the survey. For an in-depth discussion of the
setup of the survey and a description of early
research using it, see my 1997 article.

2
The Philadelphia Fed’s website (at: www.
philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/realtime-center/livingston-survey/) contains background material about the Livingston Survey,
news releases from the survey going back to
1991, data files containing both forecasts of
individuals and means or medians across the
forecasters for each variable in each survey, and
an academic bibliography listing research papers
that have used the survey.
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The Survey of Professional
Forecasters began as the idea of
Victor Zarnowitz and others at the
American Statistical Association and
the National Bureau of Economic
Research. They began the ASA/
NBER Economic Outlook Survey in
1968 and successfully carried it out
for 22 years. The survey was similar
to the Livingston Survey in that it
asked private-sector forecasters for
their projections for the next year for
major macroeconomic variables. But
the ASA/NBER survey was conducted
more frequently than the Livingston
Survey (quarterly instead of semiannually), asked for quarterly forecasts
(instead of Livingston’s half-year
forecasts), and included some unique
questions about the probabilities of
different outcomes, instead of asking
just for the point forecasts (that is, the
most likely outcome) reported by the
Livingston Survey. In 1990, the ASA/
NBER turned the survey over to the
Philadelphia Fed, which rechristened it
the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF).3
Why do people need forecasts?
When planning their personal
budgets, people need to know what
the forecast for inflation is; when
planning production, firms need to
forecast demand for their products;
when buying and selling financial
assets, investors need to forecast both
inflation and future interest rates;

3
For more on the setup of the Survey of
Professional Forecasters and its origins, see my
1993 article. The Philadelphia Fed’s website
(at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-anddata/real-time-center/survey-of-professionalforecasters/) contains background material
about the survey, news releases from the survey
going back to 1990, data files containing both
forecasts of individuals and means or medians
across the forecasters for each variable in
each survey, an academic bibliography listing
research papers that have used the survey, and
forecast error statistics that present data on the
accuracy of the survey forecasts.
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and when setting policy, government
analysts need to know how the
economy is likely to fare in the future.
Forecasting surveys can help all of
these groups figure out the most likely
outcomes for the variables that most
concern them.
The Philadelphia Fed’s surveys
are not the only surveys of forecasters. A well-known U.S. survey is the
Blue Chip Economic Indicators, which

a European version of the Survey of
Professional Forecasters in 1999 after
consulting with the Philadelphia Fed
on its methods.
The table on page 3 lists the major
macroeconomic variables covered by
the surveys, for which the respondents
provide short-term forecasts (for the
next one to two years). In addition
to those variables, the surveys ask for
long-term forecasts — the SPF asks



      
in both the CPI and PCE price index for the
     
!"  

 #$
"  %&     '
was started by Robert Eggert in 1976.
The Blue Chip concept was to publish
forecasts monthly (compared with the
quarterly SPF and the semi-annual
Livingston Survey) and to publish the
names of each forecaster along with
his or her forecast (forecasters for
both the SPF and the Livingston were
anonymous). In addition, the National
Association for Business Economics
(NABE) has produced a quarterly
survey of forecasters since the early
1960s, and the Wall Street Journal
also conducts a similar survey that is
reported in great detail on its website.
Direct measurement of consumers’
inflation expectations is gathered by
the monthly Reuters/University of
Michigan survey of consumers, which
asks a random sample of consumers for
their forecasts of inflation. For other
countries there have been a number of
surveys, most notably Consensus Forecasts, which gathers detailed forecasts
for all major developed countries in
the world and less detailed forecasts
for numerous other countries. Also,
the European Central Bank started

about forecasts for inflation in both
the CPI and PCE price index for the
next five years and the next 10 years,
while the Livingston Survey asks about
real GDP growth and CPI inflation
for the next 10 years. In addition, in
every survey, the SPF asks about the
probability of a decline in real GDP
in each of the next five quarters and
about the probability that real GDP,
the inflation rate in the GDP price
index, the CPI excluding food and
energy, and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index
excluding food and energy will fall into
certain ranges. The latter questions are
designed to get an idea of the degree of
uncertainty that forecasters attach to
their forecasts. Each survey also asks
special questions from time to time on
a variety of topics of current interest.
Both the SPF and the Livingston
Survey provide anonymity for the
forecasters. The survey news release
lists the names of the forecasters, but
a reader cannot tell which forecaster
provided which forecast. The benefit
of anonymity is that the forecasters
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TABLE
Variables Included in the Surveys
Both Surveys
nominal gross domestic product (GDP)

real (inflation-adjusted) GDP

unemployment rate

inflation (consumer price index, CPI)

industrial production

corporate profits after tax

business fixed investment

housing starts

interest rate on three-month Treasury bills

interest rate on 10-year Treasury notes

Livingston Survey
producer price index

S&P 500 stock prices

average weekly earnings

prime interest rate

retail trade sales

auto sales
Survey of Professional Forecasters

interest rate on AAA bonds

payroll employment

GDP price index

consumer price index excluding food and
energy prices

personal consumption expenditures price
index

personal consumption expenditures price
index excluding food and energy prices

consumption

residential fixed investment

federal government spending

state and local government spending

net exports

changes in private inventories

may be more likely to reveal their true
forecasts if they know that their name
will not be associated with a particular
forecast. If they think that their forecast is very different from that of other
forecasters, they would have no incentive to hide it. However, if they were
providing their forecasts in a nonanonymous survey (such as the Wall Street
Journal or the Blue Chip survey), they
might prefer to shade their forecasts
closer to the consensus, out of fear that
they will be seen as being out of the
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mainstream. Other forecasters might
be looking for attention and might intentionally make their forecasts stand
out from the crowd. The anonymity of
the SPF and Livingston avoids these
problems.4

4

In his study, Owen Lamont looked at a
nonanonymous survey, finding that forecasters
tended to distort their forecasts to manipulate
their reputations, while Tom Stark’s study
found no such evidence for the SPF, which is
anonymous.

The timing of the SPF and Livingston surveys differs, in part because
the SPF is conducted four times each
year, while the Livingston survey is
conducted just twice a year. More important, since the SPF focuses on the
national income accounts, the survey
forms are sent to participants immediately following the initial release of the
GDP data for the preceding quarter,
which occurs in late January, April,
July, and October each year. The
forecasters are given about 10 days to
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respond to the survey questions, and
they then e-mail their responses to the
Philadelphia Fed before the middle of
the following month (when key data
on consumer prices are released). The
Livingston Survey’s timing is based on
the release of the consumer price index
data in May and November, with the
forecasts due before the next month’s
release of the consumer price index.
EVALUATING THE SURVEY
FORECASTS
Given the uses to which people,
firms, and policymakers put the
surveys, it is important that the
forecasts be accurate. Of course, no
forecast is going to be on the mark
all the time. Economists have tested
the surveys extensively. Simple tests
examine the forecast errors over time
to see if they are zero, on average,
which would be the hallmark of
an unbiased forecast. Another test
is how precise the forecast is, that
is, how large the average error is.
More sophisticated tests look at the
correlation between forecast errors and
information available to forecasters
when they made their forecasts; if such
a correlation exists, the forecasters
in the survey are not using that
information efficiently.
A visual inspection of the data
sometimes suffices to see whether a
particular forecast has forecast errors
that are zero, on average. Figure 1
shows a scatter plot in which the
value of the inflation rate (based on
the GDP deflator over a one-year
period) is plotted on the vertical axis
and the forecasts from the Livingston
Survey for that year are plotted on
the horizontal axis. The 45-degree
line in the figure helps you gauge the
accuracy of the forecasts because if
the forecasts were perfect, every point
in the diagram would be on that line.
The fact that most of the points in
the graph are close to the 45-degree
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line suggests that the forecasts are
fairly accurate. Formal statistical
tests confirm that the mean forecast
error in this series is not statistically
significantly different from zero.5
Despite the unbiasedness of the survey
forecasts over the entire period from
the early 1970s to the mid-2000s,
there are numerous periods in which
the survey forecasts appear to have
performed poorly. Figure 2 shows the
actual values of inflation (measured
using the GDP price index) over a oneyear period compared with the SPF
forecasts for the corresponding period.
The SPF forecasts for inflation
were clearly far from the mark in
the early and late 1970s, with very
large forecast errors. Perhaps these
forecast errors were understandable,
given the unprecedented increase in
the growth of the money supply that
occurred during that decade, which
caught forecasters by surprise. In the
early 1980s, the forecasts were wrong
in the opposite direction, as inflation
fell much more than the forecasters
thought it would. Similarly, in most
of the 1990s, the forecasters made a
string of forecast errors, with inflation
continually coming in lower than
the forecasters had projected. In that
period, productivity growth surged,
and it took some time before the
forecasters realized that the economy
was not overheating, but rather that
potential output was increasing more
rapidly than before, so inflation would
not be rising significantly.6 Thus, the
forecasters clearly go through periods
in which they make persistent forecast
errors.
In addition to periods in which
the forecasters make persistent forecast

5

See my 2010 paper.

6
These concepts are explored in more detail in
my 2010 paper.

errors, the forecasters in the surveys
may be inefficient in their use of other
information. Economists test this idea
by examining the relationship between
the survey’s forecast errors and data
that were known when the forecasters
made their forecasts. For example,
Laurence Ball and I found that output
forecast errors were associated with
changes in the real (inflation-adjusted)
federal funds rate (the interest rate
on short-term loans between banks,
which is the Federal Reserve’s main
policy instrument), which means that
the forecasters did not accurately
modify their forecasts in response to
a change in monetary policy. This
can be seen in Figure 3, which plots
the output forecast error from the
SPF (the actual rate of output growth
minus the forecasted rate of output
growth) against the lagged change
in the real federal funds rate. The
negative relationship between these
two variables implies that the output
forecasts from the SPF are not efficient
with respect to changes in monetary
policy.
A little-explored aspect of the SPF
is the probability distribution forecasts
it provides. Each forecaster is asked
to list the probability that real GDP
growth and inflation in the GDP price
index will fall into certain ranges. In
the most recent surveys, the forecasters
are asked to state the probability that
real GDP growth in the next year
will be 6 percent or more, 5.0 to 5.9
percent, 4.0 to 4.9 percent, 3.0 to
3.9 percent, 2.0 to 2.9 percent, 1.0
to 1.9 percent, 0.0 to 0.9 percent, -1.0
to -0.1 percent, -2.0 to -1.1 percent,
and -2.0 percent or less. The same
question is also asked for real GDP
growth in the following year. For the
percent change in the GDP price
index, the ranges are two percentage
points higher, so the top range is 8
percent or more, and so on.
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FIGURE 1
Forecasts Versus Actuals: Livingston Survey
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Frank Diebold, Anthony Tay,
and Kenneth Wallis analyzed these
probability distribution forecasts from
the SPF using new methods. Their
goal was to test the accuracy of the
distribution forecasts, and for the most
part, they found that the forecasts
were reasonably accurate. However,
the forecasts failed to pass some tests:
(1) they placed too large a probability
on a large decline in inflation; and
(2) they made persistent inflation
forecast errors, though the forecasters
eventually adapted and the errors
disappeared. They also found that
when inflation was low, uncertainty
about inflation was also low.
Overall, recent research on the
accuracy of the SPF and Livingston
forecasts has found that they are
reasonable, even if there are a few
areas in which they are imperfect.
However, as the literature using the
surveys for research evolved over time,
the accuracy of the forecasts was often
called into question.
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USING THE SURVEYS
TO ANSWER RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
We now turn to a discussion
about the areas of research in which
researchers have used the SPF and
Livingston Survey. These include
investigating whether people have
rational expectations, studying how
people form their expectations,
conducting empirical studies of
macroeconomic theories, and
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7
This section discusses many of the major
research studies that have used the surveys.
For a more complete list of such studies, see
the bibliographies posted on the Philadelphia
Fed’s website at www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-ofprofessional-forecasters/academic-bibliography.
cfm and www.philadelphiafed.org/researchand-data/real-time-center/livingston-survey/
academic-bibliography.cfm.
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FIGURE 3
Output Forecast Errors and Change in
Real Fed Funds Rate
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answering questions about monetary
policy.7
Economists have written major
research papers using both the SPF
and Livingston surveys, beginning with
Stephen Turnovsky. Turnovsky tried
to show how forecasters formed their
expectations, and he developed an
early test of rationality of the forecasts
using the Livingston Survey. The
first paper to use the SPF (actually its
predecessor, the ASA/NBER survey)
was one by Vincent Su and Josephine
Su, which evaluated the accuracy of
the survey forecasts using only a few
years of data.
None of the earliest papers to use
the Livingston Survey are reliable,
however, because John Carlson
discovered a major flaw in the data
(which has subsequently been fixed).
Because the survey’s original purpose
was for journalism, Livingston did
not report the actual forecasts of the
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forecasters in his newspaper column.
Instead, he modified the forecast
data if a data release occurred after
the forecasters had submitted their
forecasts but before his newspaper
column appeared and if the data
release would have changed the overall
nature of the forecasts.
Carlson gives the following example. Suppose the CPI was released
in September and October with a
value of 121.1 and the forecasters have
an average forecast for the following
June of 121.2. Then, if the November
data release (which came out after the
forecasters had answered the survey
but before the survey results were
reported) for the CPI is 121.1, the June
forecast is reasonable and Livingston
would not adjust the forecast. But
suppose the November CPI data were
released as 121.6. Then if Livingston
reported the November number and
the June forecast, it would appear that

the forecasters thought there would be
deflation, even though they were really
forecasting a small amount of inflation.
So, Livingston would instead report a
forecast of 121.7, which maintains the
0.1 increase in the CPI that the forecasters thought would happen. But this
means that the reported forecasts were
fictional and depended on Livingston’s
personal judgment. Carlson remedied
this situation by obtaining the true
forecast values from Livingston and
thus restoring the integrity of the data
set. Carlson showed that Livingston’s
adjustments made the forecasts look
better. Studies based on the incorrect data obtained somewhat different
results compared with results based on
the corrected data.
Rational Expectations. The
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys of
forecasters were initially used by
researchers in the early 1970s to
investigate the concept of rational
expectations, which asserts that
people do not make systematic errors
in forecasting. A number of early
papers had used the Livingston Survey
forecasts of inflation and rejected
the rational expectations hypothesis
because researchers found that the
survey forecasts were biased (with
a nonzero mean forecast error) and
inefficient (because the forecast errors
were correlated with data known when
the survey was taken).
But in a 1978 study, Donald
Mullineaux found a major flaw in the
statistical procedure previous studies
had used to test for and reject the
rationality of expected inflation in
the Livingston Survey.8 Mullineaux
then proposed a new test that is not

8
The flaw is that the test used in much previous
work (known as the Chow test) assumed identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) errors
in a framework where that is unlikely to hold.
Mullineaux showed that the assumption can be
rejected.
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subject to the same statistical problem
and found that the properly specified
data are consistent with people having
rational expectations.
The early literature on rational
expectations often ran tests for
unbiasedness and inefficiency of the
survey forecasts. But those tests were
flawed in an important way because
they failed to account for the fact
that a forecast error in one survey
forecast carried over to other surveys
because the length of the forecast
horizon (eight or 14 months) was
longer than the interval between
surveys (six months). Thus, a sudden
rise in inflation in one period could
lead to forecast errors in two or three
consecutive surveys, a situation
that has come to be known as the
overlapping observations problem.
By failing to account for this
correlation in the forecast errors, the
researchers’ tests for unbiasedness and
inefficiency were overstating the case
against the surveys. Bryan Brown and
Shlomo Maital finally remedied this
situation, making a key methodological
contribution: recognizing the
overlapping-observations problem and
showing how to adjust the statistical
tests so that they gave the correct
inference. Brown and Maital then
tested the Livingston Survey data for
unbiasedness and efficiency. They
generally found no bias, unlike many
earlier researchers. But they did find
some evidence that the Livingston
Survey forecast errors were correlated
with changes in money growth.9
Another challenge to rational
expectations using the surveys came
from Eugene Fama and Michael
Gibbons. They created alternative
inflation forecasts based on nominal
and real interest rates, as well as

9
A related correlation is found in my paper with
Laurence Ball.
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changes in those rates. They showed
that the inflation forecasts based
on interest rates outperformed the
Livingston Survey forecasts of inflation
from 1977 to 1982.
Many other researchers became
convinced that forecasters did not
have rational expectations. One of
them, Douglas Pearce, did a simple
experiment to show how irrational
the survey forecasts were. Pearce then
constructed a forecast of inflation in
which the change in the inflation rate
from one period to the next depended
only on the unexpected change in the
inflation rate in the previous period
and ignored data on other variables
that a forecaster might use to forecast, including the money supply and
the strength of the economy. Pearce
correctly used only the data that the
participants in the Livingston Survey
had available to them at the time when
they made their forecasts (known as
real-time data; see the study that I did
with Tom Stark for more on this concept of real-time data analysis). Pearce
compared his simple model’s forecasts
with the forecasts from the Livingston
Survey and found that his model had
much better forecasts for inflation than
the survey. He also showed that the
rise in interest rates in the 1970s was
better explained by his simple model
than by the Livingston Survey.
If a very simple model can provide
better forecasts than the forecasters in
the survey, it would seem that the survey forecasts aren’t that valuable, and
professional forecasters are irrational
because they could have used Pearce’s
model and made better forecasts.10

10
Later research showed that Pearce’s results,
though powerful, weakened over time. If
you use the same method that Pearce used
and the additional data that we have today,
you would find that the survey now does
better than the simple model that Pearce
used. See my 2010 paper for an extensive
analysis of the use of Pearce’s method.

After many studies that found
fault with the forecasting surveys,
many economists began to believe that
either people did not have rational
expectations or that the surveys did
not represent people’s true forecasts,
or both. Michael Keane and David
Runkle sought to disprove both
hypotheses, arguing that much of the
literature on testing survey forecasts
for rationality suffered from three
flaws: (1) the use of the average
forecast across forecasters was wrong
because forecasters may have different
information; (2) other research
studies failed to adjust properly for
data revisions; and (3) other research
studies failed to account for the
correlation of forecast errors across
forecasters. Keane and Runkle avoided
these problems by using individual
forecasts on the GNP deflator, basing
their analysis on real-time data (the
first revision of the national income
data, which come out one month after
the initial release), and developing a
statistical method that accounts for
the correlation of forecast errors across
forecasters. They evaluated currentquarter inflation forecasts from the
SPF, finding that they were unbiased
and efficient.
Overall, the literature on rational
expectations has benefited tremendously from the existence of the SPF
and the Livingston Survey. Though
the results of tests for rationality have
been mixed over time, more recent
evaluations generally suggest that the
survey forecasts are fairly accurate
and pass most, though not all, tests for
rationality.
Expectations Formation. Research
on how people form expectations
has a slightly different goal than the
literature on testing rational expectations; it uses the surveys to investigate
what information forecasters use to
form their forecasts and the properties
of their forecasts.
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Alex Cukierman and Paul
Wachtel introduced the idea that
inflation expectations differ across
individuals because people have
different information at their disposal.
In this situation, an increase in
people’s uncertainty about inflation
leads to more variability in their
inflation expectations over time
than when inflation is more stable.
Cukierman and Wachtel used the
Livingston Survey forecasts on CPI
inflation to examine the differences
in inflation expectations across
forecasters. They found that the
variability of expected inflation across
forecasters is positively related to the
variability of the inflation rate and
the growth rate of the economy’s
output. Thus, volatility in the economy
translates into uncertainty in people’s
forecasts.
One branch of this literature is
devoted to finding variables that are
correlated with the survey forecasts,
thus revealing the data that forecasters
find important in forming their
forecasts. In a 1980 study, Donald
Mullineaux used the Livingston Survey
forecasts to examine how forecasters
form inflation expectations, using
real-time data on the money supply
(that is, the data known to forecasters
when they made their forecasts, rather
than revised data). He found that the
forecasters used money-growth data
in forming their forecasts, not just
lagged inflation data, so that inflation
forecasting models that are just
based on past inflation rates are not
efficient. Mullineaux found evidence
that the expectations-formation
process changed over time, perhaps
in response to changes in the way
monetary policy was conducted.
This is an important finding,
since it provides evidence that is
consistent with theoretical research by
Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas, who
argued that when the Federal Reserve
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changes the process by which it sets
monetary policy (a process that clearly
changed in the 1970s), equations such
as those describing the formation of
inflation expectations will undergo
significant changes. Mullineaux also
found evidence that the same model
determining inflation expectations
also determines actual inflation, so
that survey forecasts are rational.
One of the most important papers
in this literature is that of Victor Zarnowitz and Louis Lambros, who were
the first to combine and compare the
SPF point forecasts with the probability distribution forecasts.11 They considered two concepts: (1) consensus,
which is the degree to which the point
forecasts are similar across forecasters;
and (2) uncertainty, which is the degree to which an individual forecaster
thinks a certain outcome is likely and
is a measure of how much risk there is
to her or his point forecast. Zarnowitz
and Lambros found that consensus
across forecasters may be very different
from the uncertainty that each individual forecaster has about his or her
forecast. Previously, most researchers
had equated consensus and uncertainty, which had the effect of understating the true degree of uncertainty.
Zarnowitz and Lambros also found
that higher inflation rates were associated with greater uncertainty about
inflation and showed that increased
inflation uncertainty was associated
with lower real output growth.
Recently, numerous researchers
have begun focusing on how
households form their own inflation

11
The difference between a point forecast and a
probability distribution forecast can be illustrated by an example. The survey’s point forecast
for inflation in the next year could be 2.5 percent. The probability distribution forecast might
be a 25 percent chance that inflation will be 1.0
to 1.9 percent, a 50 percent chance that inflation will be 2.0 to 2.9 percent, and a 25 percent
chance that inflation will be 3.0 to 3.9 percent.

expectations. Gregory Mankiw,
Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers noted
that professional forecasters disagree
with each other in their forecasts
of inflation, as do consumers. They
showed that the extent to which
forecasters disagree changes over
time. To explain these disagreements,
they developed a “sticky-information”
model. The basic idea of sticky
information is that collecting and
analyzing information involves
costs, so that people update their
expectations infrequently. They
then used the Michigan survey
of consumers, the SPF, and the
Livingston Survey to verify their
model. They found that their model
helps to explain the irrationality of
inflation expectations, including why
forecast errors are persistent and why
it takes some time before news is
incorporated into the forecasts.
A related paper is that of
Christopher Carroll, who developed
an interesting hypothesis: Households
may not have rational expectations,
but rather form their expectations by
reading professional forecasts, which
are rational. (See How Would You
Forecast?) Households’ expectations
may not be rational because they
only occasionally read the forecasts
of professional forecasters and don’t
always pay attention to them. To
test this view, Carroll examined
whether the forecasts in the Michigan
survey of consumers incorporate
information from the SPF, or vice
versa. By examining the relationship
between the actual inflation rate, the
Michigan consumer survey forecasts,
and the SPF forecasts of inflation, he
was able to show that the Michigan
forecast contains no additional
information that is not already in
the SPF, but the SPF does contain
additional information that is not in
the Michigan survey. He also found
evidence that SPF forecasts affected
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How Would You Forecast?

I

f you were asked to forecast the economy,
how would you do it? You might say, “I
am not in the business of forecasting,
so I don’t know how I would construct
forecasts of the economy!” But it turns
out that most of us have some intuition
about how the economy is going to fare in the future. For
example, the Michigan survey of consumers asks people
who are not economists what they think the inflation
rate will be over the coming year, and the consumers
answer the question very well, in some periods forecasting
inflation better than the professional economists in the
Livingston Survey and the SPF.
One thing you could do is to look at recent values
and assume that the future will be just like today. Or
you might take a class at your local university and learn
techniques of time-series forecasting, which would be far
more sophisticated than assuming the future is like today
and would give you much better forecasts. But most of us
do not want to spend that much time to forecast for three
good reasons: (1) the costs of forecasting are high because

most of us do not know much about forecasting; (2) the
benefits of forecasting are low because our lives are not
strongly affected by being able to forecast better; and (3)
we can read the newspaper or surf the web and easily
learn about the forecasts of experts, so why should we
bother to make our own?
As our discussion in the text of Christopher Carroll’s
research suggests, most people do not spend much time
forecasting, but they do read about forecasts in the
media and on the Internet. As a result, the forecasts of
experts are distributed around the country gradually over
time. Thus, even though only a few economic experts
take the time to work out their own forecasts, their
views influence the forecasts of many citizens and thus
affect economic activity. A further reason to turn to a
survey like the Survey of Professional Forecasters or the
Livingston is that the surveys combine the efforts of a
number of forecasters who often look at the economy
from different perspectives. As a result, a forecast that
averages all of the projections (using the mean or the
median) is often superior to any individual forecast.*

*There is a substantial amount of research in the area of forecast combination, which shows that simple averages of many forecasts often perform
better than nearly all individual forecasts. See Alan Timmermann’s article for an overview.

later Michigan surveys but that the
Michigan survey did not affect later
SPF forecasts. This result suggests
that, over time, households come to
incorporate the SPF forecasts. Carroll’s
results are also supported by the fact
that when news coverage of inflation
is high, Michigan forecasts get closer
to SPF forecasts. Similar results occur
when Carroll uses the unemployment
rate in his empirical work, rather than
the inflation rate.
Empirical Macroeconomics.
One puzzle that survey forecasts
helped solve was the issue of why
real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates
declined so much in the 1970s. James
Wilcox used the Livingston Survey
forecasts of inflation in an attempt to
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determine the main factors affecting
nominal and real interest rates. He
discovered that much of the decline
in real interest rates in the 1970s
(though not all) was due to increases
in expected inflation rates. He argued
that previous models failed to include
a supply-shock variable representing
the prices on inputs, such as oil prices.
Once he included such a variable and
used the Livingston Survey forecasts
to represent expected inflation in
calculating the real interest rate, his
model fit the data well. In a related
paper, Kajal Lahiri, Christie Tiegland,
and Mark Zaporowski found that
uncertainty about inflation (measured
using the probability variables in the
SPF) also affected real interest rates.

Their main result was that increased
uncertainty about inflation causes
the real interest rate to decline, with
investment spending declining more
than saving.
One of the most famous papers
that empirically tests macroeconomic
theory was that of Robert Hall, who
found evidence supporting economists’
major theory of consumption, which
is that income in a given year has
less impact on consumption spending
than households’ long-run average
income, a theory known as the lifecycle/permanent-income hypothesis.
Hall used the Livingston Survey to
calculate the expected inflation rate
and the expected return to the stock
market. He also found that changes in
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the real interest rate have little effect
on consumption spending, much less
than some economists had thought
before Hall’s research.
This discussion only touches
on some of the main studies in the
empirical macroeconomics literature
that have benefited from the
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys.
Monetary Policy. One of
the main mechanisms by which
monetary policy affects the economy
is by affecting people’s inflation
expectations. Researchers have
suggested that the Federal Reserve
bases monetary policy on inflation
and the degree to which output
in the economy is above or below
trend (known as the output gap).
The equation relating the federal
funds interest rate (which measures
monetary policy) to inflation and the
output gap is known as the Taylor rule,
named after John Taylor of Stanford
University, who developed the idea.
Most of the research done in this area
suggests that the Fed looks at past
inflation and the past output gap.
But Athanasios Orphanides used the
SPF to obtain forecasts of inflation
and output to use in the Taylor rule
and found that this produced better
estimates of what the Fed did than
using past data. Thus, the Fed appears
to follow a forward-looking Taylor rule
rather than a backward-looking rule.
How does the Fed respond to
changes in expected inflation? Sylvain
Leduc, Keith Sill, and Tom Stark
investigated this issue, using the
Livingston Survey as a source for the
economy’s expected inflation rate.
They found that before 1979, the Fed
responded to increases in expected
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inflation by increasing the federal
funds interest rate. But because the
Fed did not increase the interest rate
by as much as expected inflation
increased, the real interest rate
declined. This more accommodative
monetary policy was followed by higher
inflation, and the authors concluded
that monetary policy contributed
to the rise in inflation in the 1970s.
However, after 1979, the Fed did the
opposite, tightening monetary policy

percentage-point rise in the long-term
expected inflation rate implies a 20
percent reduction in stock prices. Sean
Campbell and Frank Diebold showed
that the Livingston Survey could be
used to predict stock returns, with
stronger economic growth related to
lower stock returns, and vice versa.
The surveys have also been
used to investigate optimal methods
of forecasting. Andrew Ang, Geert
Bekaert, and Min Wei compared

( )  
    
  " *     "  
           '
when expected inflation increased,
thus raising the real interest rate and
reducing future inflation.
Other Important Research
Results. One key question about the
data that are issued by government
statistical agencies is whether data
revisions are forecastable or not. Knut
Mork sought to answer that question
using the SPF survey as a measure of
information known at the time the
government releases its initial GDP
data. He found that GDP revisions
were correlated with the SPF forecast
of GDP, and thus the revisions were
forecastable, which means that the
government’s initial data releases are
not efficient and could be improved.
Some economists have also
used the Philadelphia Fed surveys to
investigate a hypothesis in financial
economics. Steven Sharpe related the
SPF forecasts of one-year inflation
rates and 10-year inflation rates to
stock returns, finding that a one-

inflation forecasts from the Livingston
Survey, SPF, and the Michigan survey
of consumers. They found that the
surveys forecast inflation better than
do a number of other forecasting
models that economists use. They also
found that the Michigan forecasts are
only slightly worse than the SPF and
Livingston forecasts but still do better
than the other forecasting methods.
SUMMARY
There can be little doubt that
the Philadelphia Fed’s surveys
of forecasters have played an
instrumental role in economic research
in the past 40 years. The surveys have
been used to test rational-expectations
theory, to analyze the formation of
inflation expectations, to conduct
empirical research in macroeconomics,
and to investigate the formation and
impact of monetary policy, and they
have been used in a variety of other
studies as well. BR
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